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I
T HE NAMING of a new justice to the Supreme Court quite prop-
erly interests the country at large as well as the profession. What,
we always want to know, has he said or done in the past? What, the
reporters always ask, is his "judicial philosophy"P In the case of Mr.
Justice Stewart, we perhaps ought to eschew the latter inquiry because
he himself has told us: "I really don't know what it is."' It may be use-
ful, however, even though we can answer the question no more positively
than the new appointee, to look briefly at some aspects of his career on
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on which he served for over
four years immediately prior to his appointment. But first, the scanty
vital statistics should be noted.
Stewart's path is the well-worn one leading from Cincinnati to Yale
College and Yale Law School, where he was graduated in 1941. As an
undergraduate, he served as chairman of the Yale Daily News, and in
law school, was the comment editor of the Yale Law Journal. After
seeing duty with the Navy during the war, he finally landed back in
Cincinnati for a period of practice before his initial judicial appointment
in 1954.2
Of his intellectual comings and goings in this period, one knows
little. As an undergraduate, Stewart announced for the Yale Daily
News: "Because we believe wholeheartedly in the philosophy of the
* B.A. 1935, LL.B. 1938, Wake Forest College; M.A. 1942, Ph.D. 1947, Princeton
University. Professor of Law, Duke University. Author, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND
(1951). Contributor to legal publications.
'N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1958, p. x, col. 1.
2Stewart was appointed to the Court of Appeals in June 1954. He was associated
in Cincinnati with the firm of Dinsmore, Shohl, Sawyer & Dinsmore, becoming a
partner in 1951. This paragraph in the text and the succeeding one are drawn from
the N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1958, and 4 Yale Law Report No. 3, PP. 9-t (Winter 1958).
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New Deal, we shall, in general, support the President." Possibly, he
now regards this as a youthful indiscretion. At any rate, back in Cin-
cinnati, he was a Republican and was twice elected to the city council.
He is said to have been suggested to the President as a Supreme Court
nominee by Senator Bricker3 and to enjoy the approval of representatives
of the American Bar Association, along with the enthusiastic support of
his professors at Yale.'
II
When Stewart was appointed to the Court of Appeals in 1954, he
brushed aside a suggestion that he might be somewhat handicapped in
his work on the bench by his lack of judicial experience with the com-
ment that "being fair-minded is something that's either there or not."5
While this remark was hardly intended to do service as a philosophy of
law, it does perhaps provide a significant clue to the present Justice's
scheme of values. For while he often revealed a solicitude for other
values, this concern that the end product of the law shall bear the
stamp of fair-mindedness was never long out of sight. It will not
do to dismiss this concern as unimportant merely because it is subscribed
to by the entire judicial fraternity, or because Stewart might sometimes
have seemed quixotic in his concept of fairness, or because he was
sometimes unequal to the task of synthesizing his notions of fairness
with defensible legal doctrine.' For, on other occasions, Stewart did
SN.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1958, p. z6, col. x. The Times added: "However, it is known
that the Justice Department has had its eye on Judge Stewart for some time and had
recommended him for the job independently of any recommendations that might have
been made by the Senator."
' Dean Rostow said that Stewart "will be an excellent justice . . . one of the strong
members" of the Court. Professor Gulliver remarked that Stewart was "one of the most
intelligent, dynamic and personally attractive students who have attended the Yale Law
School in the past thirty years."
5N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1958, p. 24, col. z. The Yale Law Report renders what is
possibly the same remark as: "Fairness is really what justice is." 4 Yale Law Report,
op. cit. supra note 2, at so.
' See Shepard v. United States, 257 F.zd 293 (6th Cir. 1958). Here, Stewart denied
a plea that a sentence be revised because of a flagrant disparity. The prisoner argued
that he was no more guilty than others who had been his confederates in a counterfeiting
ring and that whereas the confederates were sentenced in another court to terms of only
one to six and one-half years, he had received a sentence of 15 years. Plainly troubled
by the situation, Stewart wrote:
"Every year numerous appeals come before this court which accentuate a seriously
urgent problem-the disparity of sentences in federal criminal cases. The present
appeal is illustrative. Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal
its surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives. Whether a sentence is
fair cannot, of course, be gauged simply by comparing it with the punishment imposed
[Vol. 19S9: 32S
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accomplish this synthesis. Indeed, had his views prevailed, much of the
iniquity of the retroactive provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of I9527 would now be behind us.
Stewart had his say on this problem in a case" involving the Gov-
ernment's effort to deport one Carson who had entered this country as a
stowaway in i919. Later, in 1936, Carson was convicted of two criminal
offenses, and deportation proceedings were instituted against him. But
these proceedings were abandoned when Carson received a "conditional
pardon" in 1945. This pardon rendered Carson immune from de-
portation under the law then in effect, and he had long before achieved
a like immunity in respect to his illegal entry in i919. However, after
the passage of the 1952 Act, with its retroactive provisions,' the Gov-
ernment again tried to deport Carson because of the earlier convictions
and because of his illegal entry. Carson sought refuge in the savings
clause'0 of the Act, which declared that "unless otherwise specifically pro-
vided," nothing in the Act should "be construed to affect the validity
of ...any status, condition, [or] right in process of acquisition ...
existing at the time this Act shall take effect .... " The Government,
in reply, argued that there had been specific provision "otherwise"; that
the section making illegal entry and criminal conviction grounds for
deportation had also included a provision that the section should apply
"notwithstanding" that its effect would be retroactive."
Perhaps this "notwithstanding" language together with that em-
upon others for similar offenses. But that test, though imperfect, is hardly irrelevant.
It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for
the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings
against him should have so neglected this most important dimension of fundamental
justice." Shepard v. United States, supra at 294. See generally the symposium,
Sentencing, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 399 (1958).
'Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 101-503, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-481 (Supp. V, 1958 ) .
a United States ex rel. Carson v. Kershner, 228 F.zd 14z (6th Cir. 1955) rev'd sub
nom. Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (0957).
gImmigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V, 1958).
"Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 28o, 8 U.S.C. § iloi.
" Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 2o8, 8 U.S.C. § 12 5 I(d). The
language referred to was: "(d) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section,
the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the
classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section notwithstanding (1) that any such
alien entered the United States prior to June 27, 1952, [the date of enactment of this
Act] or (z) that the facts, by reason of which any such alien belongs to any of the
classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, occurred prior to June 27, 1952 [the
date of enactment of this Act]." (Emphasis added.)
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phasized in the footnote is clearly a specific provision "otherwise." The
Supreme Court, all nine, later thought the matter so obvious that it
contented itself with merely quoting the disputed sections of the Act.12
But Stewart was unwilling to yield the point without a fight. Congress
had not been as specific as it might have been; it could have expressly
stated that the savings clause did not affect proceedings under the sec-
tion in question. Moreover, a unanimous Supreme Court had said in
United States v. Menasche13 that the savings clause was to receive a
most generous interpretation, that the clause manifested "a well-estab-
lished Congressional policy not to strip aliens of advantages gained
under prior laws." Nor was Stewart unmindful of his obligation to give
section I25id (containing the "notwithstanding" language) some effect.
It could be used, he pointed out, to ensnare the alien who had not
achieved a status of immunity from deportation although the acts on
which a proceeding was based had occurred prior to the passage of the
1952 law and at the time were insufficient to support an action against
the alien. Unless some such interpretation was adopted, he reasoned,
the savings clause would be "all but meaningless," for only where there
had been a change in the law was such a clause "of any moment at
all.' 4
Stewart's opinion in Carson's case, for all its audacity, does not show
him to be unmindful of the complexities of fairness. But even more
striking in this connection is the one segregation case that he heard be-
fore coming to the Supreme Court.' 5 In this case, Stewart had an ex-
perience which makes him unique among Supreme Court justices, in
that he alone has fRced the aftermath of the Brown ' decision from the
standpoint of a judge who must direct in detail the framing of a decree
to meet a particular situation. The case came from the small Ohio
town of Hillsboro where, soon after the first Brown opinion, the school
board set up a school district plan patently devised to continue segrega-
tion until some new buildings would be available two or three years later.
'1Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957). Justices Black
and Douglas, although joining in the Court's interpretation of the Act, dissented on
constitutional grounds.
13 348 U.S. 528, 535 (955) where a status in respect to naturalization was held
to be preserved. See also, Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540 (1955).
1, United States ex rel. Carson v. Kershner, zz8 F.zd 142, 147 (6th Cir. '955).
15 Clemons v. Board of Education, 2z8 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
xoo6 (1956).
16 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (955).
17Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 4S3 (1954).
[Vol. 1959: 325
Vol 1959: 325] MR. JUSTICE STEWART 329
In a class action, seven Negroes sought for themselves and all others
similarly situated an immediate end to the enforcement of the plan. The
district judge, impressed by the board's plea that the white schools were
already overcrowded and the board's assurances that the situation would
be alleviated on the completion of the new buildings, refused injunctive
relief. The plaintiffs appealed.
Judgment was rendered by the court of appeals early in January
1956. One of the three judges was willing to allow the district court
decision to stand, on the ground that the grant of the equitable relief
sought was a matter of discretion. But Stewart and his associate, Judge
Allen, joined in declaring that the plaintiffs' claim was a "matter of
right." For Judge Allen, this ended the matter. The plaintiffs were
entitled immediately to the relief they sought. But for Stewart, the
situation was not so simple. He recognized that the "deliberate speed"
formula gave the trial judge no excuse for an outright refusal of in-
junctive relief. He intimated that this would have been true even had
the case come, not from Ohio, where segregation had not been author-
ized by law for over seventy years, but from some area where what was
involved was "the uprooting of a system of education built upon decades
of state custom and state law."" Yet, he could not agree that the segre-
gation plan was to be outlawed forthwith in its entirety. It was, he
remarked, already mid-year. Necessarily, there were others-teachers
and students-who would be affected by the immediate end of all segre-
gations and "a wholesale shifting of . . . Negro and white children
[then] in school might ... serve to cause dislocation and hardship out
of proportion to the purpose to be served."' 9 The solution, therefore,
was to delay relief until the following September for those Negro chil-
dren then in school. Those not in school, on the other hand, were
entitled to immediate relief, since the hardship feared by Stewart-the
adjustment by teachers and students to newcomers in the midst of a
school year-would follow inevitably regardless of the "color" of the
school they chose to attend.
Obviously, in the segregation case just discussed, we can see a mind
sensitive to the complexities of fairness. But it should be clear already
that this sensitivity did not produce in Stewart a paralyzing indecisive-
ness resulting eventually in abandoning the pursuit of fairness because,
perchance, the way is hard. Indeed, in one case, considered at one
" Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F.2d 853, 859 (6th Cir. 1956) (concurring
opinion).
19 Ibid.
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time or another by over twenty judges, Stewart alone concluded that
there had been unfairness and was willing to do something about it.
The problem involved was the right to counsel. In 1942, a Negro
in Michigan named Henderson was sentenced to life imprisonment, the
maximum penalty, on his plea of guilty to a charge of rape. Years
later, he sought a new trial in the Michigan courts and, on the eventual
denial of his motion,20 sought relief in the federal district court through
habeas corpus, on the ground that he neither had nor was offered coun-
sel and that his plea of guilty was induced by fear of mob action. 1
Since the Michigan courts had found, on the new trial motion, on
substantial evidence, that there was no intimidation of the accused,
Stewart joined his colleagues in denying relief on that ground, although
he seemingly was doubtful on the point.2  But he was unwilling to
accept the majority conclusion that lack of representation in the cir-
cumstances of this case was to be disregarded.
Henderson had surrendered himself late one afternoon. After ques-
tioning by the police, there followed in rapid-fire order, that same eve-
ning, waiver of examination when arraigned before a justice of the peace
brought to the jaili the filing of an information by the prosecuting at-
torney; and finally, at lO:2O P.M., the convening of the Circuit Court,
with only the judge, the prosecutor, three policemen, and the court re-
porter present in addition to Henderson. After some interrogation by
the judge and a plea.of guilty, Henderson received a life sentence.
Sixteen years later, the judges for the sixth circuit could not agree
on just what the Michigan trial judge had established at his night session.
A majority was certain that there was no constitutional flaw in the pro-
ceedings, no invalidating "ingredient of unfairness."2 Henderson, in
its judgment, must be held to have understood the nature of the charges
against him and the consequences of a guilty plea. He was, at the time
of sentence, twenty-five years old and had had previous brushes with
"*People v. Henderson, 343 Mich. 465, 72 N.W.2d 177 (x955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 967 (1956).
"tHenderson v. Bannan, 256 F.zd 363 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
890 (958).
" Henderson claimed that a mob had actually formed and that he himself saw it
from the courthouse. It was demonstrable that Henderson had not seen a mob, and
there was little evidence that there was one. Henderson v. Bannan, supra note 2t, at
376. But there was a possibility that Henderson was indeed in fear of a mob. As
Stewart put it: "What was the reason for these speedy proceedings in the dead of night?
The motivation seems clearly to have been fear of possible mob violence." Henderson v.
Bannan, supra at 385 (dissenting opinion).
23 Foster v. People, 332 U.S. 134, 137 (1947).
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the law, in one of which he had been defended by a court-appointed
attorney. In the present habeas corpus proceeding, the trial judge had
found from his demeanor that he was "an intelligent and aggressive per-
sonality, keenly alert to his legal rights." 4 Moreover, although
Henderson now claimed that he had sought the aid of counsel, he was
met by the contrary finding on this point in the Michigan court and in
the district court.
For Stewart-and as has been indicated, he alone of all the judges
who considered this case took this view-"the mere recital of the head-
long succession of events which culminated in the imposition of Michi-
gan's extreme penalty is enough to invoke grave doubt that the funda-
mentals of due process of law could have been observed without counsel
to assist the defendant. 25 He charged the majority with the attitude that
Henderson's guilt was so obvious, appointment of counsel would have
made no difference.26 But what legally constitutes rape in Michigan, he
argued, is hardly a simple matter. There must be "resistance to the
utmost," and there are other subtle distinctions as well 2I As for Hen-
derson's understanding of the consequences of his plea, the record that
seemed sufficient to the majority suggested to Stewart that information
of these consequences had been imparted in only the "most tentative
and hypothetical way."2 ' And, unlike his colleages, Stewart was not
willing to accept the finding of the trial judge that Henderson had not
sought counsel. There was evidence that before the waiver of prelim-
inary examination at the arraignment, Henderson, in response to a police
officer's question as to whether he wanted counsel, had replied that he
did not. But Henderson's testimony of what went on while he was
before the justice of the peace was: "I asked him why they wouldn't let
me call my brother and why wasn't it possible to have an attorney....
", Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 380 (6th Cir. x958).
"I Id. at 387 (dissenting opinion). 26 Id. at 388 (dissenting opinion).
"7 Id. at 387 (dissenting opinion) where Stewart collects the Michigan cases. Stewart
relies heavily on United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 25o F.zd 349 (2d Cir. 1957)
where a Michigan rape plea of guilty without aid of counsel was nullified.
2I1d. at 388 (dissenting opinion). Stewart supplied the following from the record:
"Q. You know it carried a life sentence, do you? A. I didn't know that, no sir,
I didn't know that, sir.
Q. Do you have any idea what kind of sentence it carries? A. Somewhat sir, I
have heard of cases, sir.
Q. What? A. I have heard of several cases, sir.
Q. The fact it might carry a life sentence, that make any difference in your plea of
guilty? A. I wouldn't change my plea because I know I am guiltyi no use trying
to run around-trying to fight it."
'oId. at 390 (dissenting opinion).
VOL 1959: 3251
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In spite of the evidence of earlier abandonment to the police of of the
idea of counsel, Stewart argued that Henderson's testimony must be
regarded as uncontradicted and, therefore, accepted. The accused could
not be said to have waived his rights:30
The uncorroborated statement of the police officer was in-
sufficient in my opinion to support a conclusion that Henderson
was either apprised of or intelligently waived a Constitutional
right which the circumstances of this case make such a vital one.
"Where the right to counsel is of such critical importance as to be
an element of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
finding of waiver is not lightly to be made."
When he came to consider the problems raised by legislation directed
at subversives, Stewart continued to pursue his ideal of a balanced fair-
ness incorporated in defensible doctrine. While keenly aware, as we
have seen, that the Immigration Act "bristles with severities," he sought
no escape from these severities by a strained assessment of the facts in
a particular case. Thus, in a deportation proceeding based on former
membership in the Communist Party, he did not hesitate to declare
that one who had attended meetings of the Party, who had served
the Party as "Educational Director," and who had been a group leader
of a Communist club, was in a "meaningful association" with the
Party."1 On the other hand, Stewart would tolerate no shortcuts,
procedural or otherwise, merely because the subversive issue was pres-
ent. NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co. 32 is illustrative. There, the court
of appeals had to decide what to do with an NLRB enforcement petition
against an employer when an officer of the complaining union, although
previously convicted of perjury in respect to the required non-Com-
munist affidavit, had since his conviction filed a new affidavit. If we
pass over the question of whether the Board can deny a compliance status
to a union whose officer falsely swears that he is not a Communist and
"DId., quoting from Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 55, 61 (957).
"Wellman v. Butterfield, 253 F.zd 932 (6th Cir. 1958). See also Williams v.
Mulcahey, 253 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1957) and cf. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 'IS
(1957). On membership, so far as the Taft-Hartley affidavit is concerned, Stewart has
espoused the view set forth by Mr. Justice Burton in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657, 679-80 (r957). Lohman v. United States, 251 F.zd 951 (6th Cir. 1958) where
Stewart found the lower court's instructions insufficient in that it was not emphasized to
the jury that the accused must be found to have "desired" Party membership and that
the Party considered the accused to be a member.
3zz6 F.zd 194 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd sub norn. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Work-
men v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 153 (1956).
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the further question of whether a court can do so, there is still the
problem of whether the falsity of the new affidavit can properly be
inferred from the adjudicated falsity of the prior affidavit. A majority
thought that it could, applying a presumption that the officer's former
status as a Communist continued. Stewart, after noting that sinners
could always repent, and, indeed, that it was the goal of the Act that
they should, remarked:"
A jury has found that in 1950 [the union officer] was both a
Communist and a liar, to put it bluntly. Yet to indulge in the
presumption that he was therefore guilty of committing a crim-
inal offense a year later in filing the 1951 affidavit is further than
I can go on the record before us.
In respect to the Smith Act,34 Stewart has, again, had an experience
unique for a Supreme Court justice. He has had to interpret and apply
the Yates case 3 teaching on the question of proof necessary to convict
in a "conspiracy to advocate" prosecution.36 Specifically, the question
before him was: What relevance does evidence of Communist Party
doctrine have when the defendants are admittedly members of the
Party? The courts of appeals have differed on the answer.37
The problem came before Stewart in a case he heard on remand from
the Supreme Court following the Yates decision. But he had also par-
ticipated in the initial decision in his court.3" He then had joined his
colleagues in denying that the "organizing" count was barred by the
statute of limitations. He had further joined in saying that the evi-
dence was sufficient to support a conviction on the "advocacy" count.
On remand, the "organizing" count was, of course, untenable, and
since the evidence and instructions relating to it were hopelessly inter-
mingled with the evidence and instructions relating to the "advocacy"
count, the defendants undoubtedly were entitled to a new trial. But
were they entitled to an acquittal? The court unanimously answered
"Id. (dissenting opinion) at 2oo. The Supreme Court disposed of the case on the
ground that the Board had no power to deny a compliance status, but Mr. Justice Frank-
furter thought Stewart's approach an additional ground for reversal. Id. at 153 (con-
curring opinion).
2' 18 U.s.C. §§ 371, 2385 (1952).
1 1 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
"WVrellman v. United States, 253 F.2d 6oi (6th Cir. 1958).
37 United States v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Wellman v. United
States, supra note 36.
'
8 Wellman v. United States, 227 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd 354 U.S. 931
(-957).
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in the negative, but for different reasons. A majority relied, in part, as
the court had when the case was first before it, on the evidence in the
record relating to the teachings of the Communist Party. These teach-
ings, they asserted, could be used to support a jury finding that the
speech of the defendants was not mere theoretical disquisition, but was
an incitement to action.
This cannot categorically be pronounced erroneous. It all depends
on whether or not there was evidence that the Communist Party advo-
cated not only the violent overthrow of the Government, but advocated
action to accomplish that end. On this point, the majority asserted that
their "conclusions with respect to the objectives of the Communist
Party, are not affected by Yates."39  Stewart rejoined: "I do not
agree .... ,,4' He was right, of course, if the evidence before him was
no more compelling than that in Yates: For the Supreme Court had
found the evidence in the Yates case insufficient to support a conclusion
that the Communist Party advocates action.4' Unfortunately, however,
Stewart did not base his disagreement on the inadequacy of the evidence
before him in respect to Communist Party teaching. Instead, he spoke
of Yates as holding that the illegal conspiracy could not be proved by
showing the defendants' "identification with the Party and inferentially
with its tenets." 42 But the Yates decision does not, as Stewart seems
to imply, bar the drawing of inferences from the teachings of the Party.
The important thing in this connection is that if the evidence is in-
sufficient to warrant a finding that the teachings of the Party included
advocacy of action, then an individual's active identification with the
Party cannot furnish a basis for inferring that he advocated action.48
Besides disagreeing with the majority on the significance of Com-
munist Party teaching, Stewart differed from them in placing reliance on
certain statements attributed to the defendants, such as an assertion that
" Wellman v. United States, 253 F.2d 6oi, 607 (6th Cir. 1958).
"Id. (concurring opinion) at 6o9.
"'Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
"
2 Wellman v. United States, z53 F.zd 6oi, 6og (6th Cir. 1958) (concurring
opinion).
'aYates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 329 (1957). The Court said: "[B]oth
the record and the Government's brief in this Court make it clear that the Government's
thesis was that the Communist Party, or at least the Communist Party of California
constituted the conspiratorial group, and that membership in the conspiracy could
therefore be proved by showing that the individual petitioners were actively identified
with the Party's affairs and thus inferentially to its tenets. This might have been well
enough towards making out the Government's case if advocacy of the abstract doctrine
of forcible overthrow satisfied the Smith Act. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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Negroes in the South constituted "a nation within a nation and were
entitled to their own government." 44  It was enough for him that the
possibility of guilt had not been dispelled to the point where a new trial
was improper: 8
Like the Yates defendants, the present appellants were associ-
ated, although more closely, with the founding and operation of
a school where Marxist theory and technique comprised the en-
tire curriculum. The school was closed to the public. To be
sure, the statements in the present record attributed to the de-
fendants in their teaching were equivocal and, taken singly sus-
ceptible of a Constitutionally protected interpretation. How-
ever, viewed as a consistent pattern and considered along with
the appellants, alleged preparation to go "underground," and
their efforts to concentrate membership in the basic industries,
the evidence is sufficient to justify this court in affording the gov-
ernment an opportunity to retry the appellants....
Turning now to a less spectacular area of the criminal law, one can
find that on the court of appeals, Stewart was much concerned with the
problem of the allowable "unit of prosecution." His very first opinion
dealt with this problem. 6 He then had to decide whether cumulative
punishment was permitted under the Mann Act,47 when two women
were transported across a state line for immoral purposes on a single
trip. Later, Stewart was to speak for his circuit when the transporta-
tion of firearms was involved, 4  and still later, he wrote the opinion
in a case dealing with separate convictions for the sale and possession
of narcotics.49  While the problems in these cases are, of course, not
identical, they are sufficiently related to portray an evolution of some
interest.
In the Mann Act case, Stewart had an open choice, there being a
sharp division in the specific precedents. Stewart chose the two-offense
"Wellman v. United States, 253 F.2d 6oi, 6o9 (6th Cir. 1958) (concurring
opinion).
"s Ibid.
"Bell v. United States, 213 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1954), re'vd 349 U.S. 81 (x955).
ds 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
'"Rayborn v. United States, 234 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1955).
"Yancy v. United States, 252 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1958). Stewart also sat where
the problem was raised in the context of using the mails to defraud, Schumpart v.
United States, 245 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1957), and where one was charged with trans-
porting and concealing the same stolen automobile, Crawford v. United States, 254 F.2d
313 (6th Cir. 1954).
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view. He was not content to rely on a semantic resolution of the
difficulty. But his own touchstone of decision was hardly better. This
he found in the "same evidence" test. Proof of an unlawful purpose
as to one woman, he reasoned, was not proof of an unlawful purpose
as to the other. Therefore, the conclusion was that the accused rightly
suffered two convictions and two sentences.
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting, with Stewart, a semantic
argument and rejecting also his generalized approach to the problem.
Its answer was that Congress, in this particular statute, had been ambigu-
ous in its mandate, and, therefore, following the usual principle of lenity
in such situations, only one offense had been committed. 0
Some months later, Stewart was faced with the case of one Rayborn
who had been sentenced both for receiving stolen government property,
and for receiving and possessing the same property in violation of the
registration and tax requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. While
not unimpressed with the force of the offender's argument that the IRC
violation necessarily encompassed the simple receiving charge, Stewart
thought, again relying on the "same evidence" test, that two offenses
had been committed and that two punishments were proper."
Rayborn had also been sentenced for the illegal transportation of
arms and ammunition to one term because of the transportation of guns
and bullets of one caliber, and to a second term for the transportation of
guns and bullets of another caliber. However, again, only a single trip
was involved. Although now mindful that "the answers that have been
given under other criminal statutes are not necessarily helpful," Stewart
regarded the Supreme Court's opinion in the earlier case as a dear sign
that there was only one offense growing out of Rayborn's jaunt, how-
ever encumbered with the weapons of war he might have been . 2
Finally, Stewart had before him the case of one who had been con-
victed of the unlawful purchase of narcotics and also the unlawful sale,
even though the only evidence of purchase was the possession involved
in the sale. 3 Relying on a 1932 Supreme Court case,54 which arose
in a similar context, Stewart summarily affirmed the dual sentence. But
"
0 Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (955). The statute speaks of "Whoever
knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce . . . any woman or girl for the pur-
pose of prostitution." 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952). One has some sympathy with Mr.
Justice Minton's inability to see the ambiguity here. 349 U.S. at 84 (dissenting opinion).
z Rayborn v. United States, 234 F.2d 368, 369-70 (6th Cir. 1956).
"'Id. at 370-71.
' Yancy v. United States, 252 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1958).
' Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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whereas in the Mann Act case less than four years before he had, when
choice was relatively free,5" espoused the view there that two offenses
had been committed, and that, therefore, there could validly be two
sentences, he now indicated that the problem was not whether one of the
elements of a transaction had been made the occasion of punishment, but
whether cumulative punishment was proper when the various elements
were combined."6 Informed by recent Supreme Court opinions5 7 he con-
cluded, tentatively, but with new insight: 8
[I]t may be that the same evidence test, applicable to narcotics
offenses under the rule of the Blockburger case, will someday be
re-examined by the Supreme Court in the light of its decisions
applying the "same transaction" test to other criminal statutes.
[Citations omitted.] But that day has not yet come.
III
As a federal judge, Stewart has been no more able than his fellows
to escape the complexities of the federal system and, particularly, the
complexities of the role of the federal courts in that system. While his
opinions in this field are not numerous, they are sufficient perhaps to
indicate his pre-dispositions, especially when taken with an address that
he delivered to the Ohio State Bar Association in May 1957." In this
address, based in large part on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the
Lumbermen's Mutual case,6" Stewart joined in the suggestion that di-
versity jurisdiction be abolished. He put forward the familiar thesis
that federal courts have some greater work to do than determining
"whether a traffic light was red or green, or whether the truck was
traveling at fifty miles an hour or only thirty-five." But his greatest
emphasis was placed on the evils attributed to the diversity grant before
One recalls Judge Frank's remark on the dilemma of a court of appeals judge:
"[O]ur function, (as an inferior court) is often to serve as a judicial moon, reflecting
as best we can, light from the sun of our system." To which he added: "The metaphor,
of course, is inexact. Absent a clear light from our sun, we must frequently generate
our own light." United States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1956) (con-
curring opinion).
00Yancy v. United States, 252 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1958).
" Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) ; United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 28 (x95).
'
8 Yancy v. United States, 252 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1958).
Stewart, The Role of the Federal Courts in the Administration of Justice, 30 OHIo
BAR 475 (1957).
00 Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954) (concurring
opinion).
VOL. 1959: 325]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
and after Erie.6 Before, there was, of course, the Black and White
Taxicab case; 62 before, there was forum shopping; before, rights varied
"according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in-the
federal court." Afterwards, the federal judges were "no longer free to
make any independent contribution to the dev elopment or growth of
the common law." Afterwards, the federal judges were to be "mere an-
notators of the decisions of the courts of the state."
In addition, Stewart gave some indication that he believes that the
Erie doctrine is a matter of constitutional compulsion. His entire state-
ment on the point, was: "And, by basing the conclusion which it reached
in Erie v. Tompkins on Constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court
placed its decision beyond the power of Congress to disturb."
As one might expect, Stewart was more guarded in his judicial utter-
ances. For one thing, the problems which he faced on the court were
of somewhat less magnitude than those he disposed of in an address to
the Ohio lawyers of fewer than 3,000 words. Indeed, Stewart wrote no
Erie problem opinion of any great significance. He was assiduous, it can
be said, in his search for state law to the point of relying on the law re-
flected in a lower court dissent, when there was no majority opinion."'
And when referred to New York law, he accepted a New York federal
district court's interpretation of an earlier state court opinion partly on
the ground that the federal court really was another state court.64 Of
slightly more moment, perhaps, are two cases where Stewart wrote no
opinion. He concurred in deferring to a Kentucky district judge,
"versed in Kentucky law," who, while there were no Kentucky decisions
in point and authority elsewhere was sharply divided, had concluded
that Kentucky would give no right of action against one who had left
his keys in his car, and an accident involving a thief and a third party
quickly followed. 5 But he also concurred in holding that the right
to dismiss without prejudice is governed exclusively by the federal
rules.06
On federal jurisdiction questions, Stewart has carefully eschewed any
't Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (938).
, Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(192s).
" Gettins v. United States Life Ins. Co., 2z F.zd 782 (6th Cir. 1955).
"John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tarrence, 244 F.ad 86 (6th Cir. 1957).
Stewart was also convinced that the district court had properly interpreted the New
York decision.
a'Frank v. Ralston, 248 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1957).
06 Stern v. Inter-Mountain Telephone Co., 226 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1955).
IVol. 1959: 325
MR. JUSTICE STEWART
expansionist tendency. Where one confined in a Michigan state hospital
sought release not through habeas corpus, but through an action under
the Civil Rights Act for a declaratory judgment and an injunction,
Stewart affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. His basic idea was that
federal courts were to be "chary of granting declaratory or equitable
relief in an area of possible friction -between state and federal jurisdic-
tions." And the fact that the plaintiff chose to proceed under the Civil
Rights Act, with its specific approval of a "suit in equity,16 7 made no
difference. The policy of the statutory provisions relating to habeas
corpus68 was controlling, even if the language was not. And that policy
dearly was that the "corrective processes" of the state, if at all adequate,
must be exhausted in confinement cases before a federal court should
grant equitable relief."0
Likewise, Stewart declined to enjoin a prosecution under a city
ordinance requiring "labor solicitors" to procure a license for soliciting
at the cost of $25. Each day's soliciting constituted, under the ordinance,
a separate offense. The plaintiffs thus were faced with the possibility
of multiple prosecutions if they chose not to comply. Moreover, they
were asserting rights in a field which, it could be argued, had been pre-
empted by federal legislation. Nevertheless, Stewart asserted that there
was no threat of "irreparable injury which was so dear and immediate
as to warrant the intervention of a federal court of equity." 70  The
plaintiffs were relegated to the choice of either refusing compliance with
the ordinance and defending the criminal actions which were plainly
threatened, or complying, since the license fee was only $25 and there
was readily available a state action for the recovery of the fee in which
the validity of the ordinance could be tested.
Stewart has also made it clear that he views the "arises under" clause
of the federal question grant71 quite narrowly. In Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. New York Central R. Co.,"2 the railroad sought and
obtained an injunction in the fedeiral district court against a strike. Over
Stewart's protest, a majority found that the plaintiff's claim to protection
against a wrongful strike was one arising under "the laws of the United
States," since, under those laws, the railroad had the duties of a com-
mon carrier, and, therefore, a correlative right to federal relief.
'
T REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § -983 (195s).
as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
"Williams v. Dalton, 231 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956).
" Fuqua v. United Steelworkers, 253 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1958).
'28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952). 72 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1957).
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Stewart's dissent adopts an earlier circuit court opinion by Judge Minton,
where Minton took a quite opposite position on the nature of the right
violated.73  The right to immunity from a wrongful strike was, in their
(Stewart's and Minton's) view, a common law right given by a state.
The railroad's involvement in interstate commerce and the duties im-
posed on it were only incidental to the railroad's, claim and were too far
in the background to be the basis of a federal claim.
IV
The appointment of Potter Stewart to the Supreme Court has given
us notice that a new generation is taking over in law as well as else-
where. Of his predecessors, only Mr. Justice Brennan finished law
school so late as 1931. With Mr. Justice Stewart, the year is advanced
to 1941 and the years of maturation advanced still further. He alone
of the justices had his first serious encounter with the law after the revo-
lution of 1937 and after the Supreme Court, in response to repeated im-
portunities, began really to function as the guardian of civil rights.
Furthermore, it is important to note that Stewart's world has been one
in which the teachings of Pound and even Llewellyn and Frank have
long since settled into the fabric of the legal order. These old victories
he undoubtedly accepts, but only casually, much as one accepts the
abolition of the forms of action. He thus does not have the passion of a
Black or a Murphy in fashioning a new rampart. Neither does he have
the feeling one senses in Harlan of puzzlement and wonder at a strange,
new landscape. And, certainly, he does not smart under the disillusion-
ment which gave overtones of tragedy to Jackson's career.
The point of all this perhaps is that Stewart will bring few new
values within the compass of the law. But the point is also that he
can be relied on not to depreciate those values he finds already there.
He did not suffer the light from Yates to be extinguished, and in his
keeping, the flicker from Menasche became incandescent. Happily, he
inherits a more spacious legal world than did his predecessors. Perhaps
his great task-and eventually his great achievement-will be to con-
tribute toward making that legal world an orderly one.
" Toledo, P.&W. R.R. v. Bhd. of Railroad Trainmen, X37 F.zd 265, 272 (7 th Cir.
1942) (dissenting opinion).
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